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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The AGR-1 experiment being conducted by the US Department of Energy Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel 
Development and Qualification Program (AGR fuel program) will irradiate TRISO-coated particle fuel in 
compacts under conditions representative of a Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) core.  The 
anticipated fuel performance requirements of a prismatic core VHTR significantly exceed established 
TRISO-coated particle fuel capability in terms of burnup, temperature and fast fluence.  AGR-1 is the first 
in a planned series of eight irradiations leading to the qualification of low enriched uranium coated 
particle fuel compacts for service in a VHTR, as identified in an overall Technical Program Plan 
produced at the beginning of the program1.  The AGR-1 experiment is scheduled for insertion in the 
Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) in the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 and to be irradiated for a period of 
up to approximately two and a half years.  The irradiation rig, designated a “test train” is designed to 
provide six independently controlled (for temperature) and monitored (for fission product gas release) 
capsules containing fuel samples. 
A major objective of the AFR fuel program is to establish the capability to independently control and 
monitor six capsules in a single ATR location for irradiation conditions representative of a VHTR.  This 
capability is necessary to meet AGR fuel program cost and schedule constraints while supporting the 
primary elements of the Technical Program Plan:  (1) selection of a reference fuel, (2) development and 
validation of fuel performance and fission product transport models, and (3) qualification of the reference 
fuel.  It will also present an attractive fuel irradiation option for other US and international programs.  
However, the combination of functional requirements, space limitations and environmental conditions 
required of the test train presents difficult challenges for its design, fabrication and operation.  This was 
recognized from the beginning, thus the AGR-1 irradiation test was included in the program plan as a 
shakedown test of a multi-capsule test train design to establish a proven capability for the subsequent 
planned irradiation tests.  Design and fabrication of the test train is being conducted within a structured 
quality control environment in compliance with the requirements of NQA-1 (2000).  The design has been 
subjected to formal reviews at each stage of development that, in combination with the efforts of the 
designers, has identified a comprehensive set of potential problems and failure modes which are being 
addressed in design and fabrication of the test train.  Some of the more significant challenges are listed in 
this document along with design provisions incorporated to address them.  In addition, operational 
contingencies that could be implemented should potential problems arise during the irradiation are 
discussed.
The last irradiation of US low enriched uranium TRISO-coated particle fuel (HRB-21), conducted in the 
early 1990s, substantially exceeded expected particle failure and fission product release levels.  In the 
years following that irradiation, extensive efforts were undertaken to identify causes of the poor fuel 
performance and to establish the modifications to fuel property requirements and fabrication process 
conditions necessary to resolve the deficiencies.  However, considerable uncertainty remained regarding 
production of a fuel that could exhibit the high level of performance required to support VHTR design 
requirements.  Thus in reestablishing the capability to fabricate coated particle fuel in the US, the AGR 
fuel program has expended substantial effort to identify the fuel properties that are of primary importance 
for successful performance and to gain a better understanding of the relationships between process 
parameters and fuel properties.  This has resulted in the fabrication of a baseline fuel considered to have 
the best prospects for meeting performance requirements, and three variants that address the areas of 
greatest uncertainty with respect to the performance of the baseline fuel. 
Given the difficulties associated with the challenging test train design and the uncertainties associated 
with production of fuel capable of meeting the anticipated high VHTR performance requirements, it is 
anticipated that some problems will arise during final assembly and irradiation of AGR-1 and that there 
may be some surprises with respect to the performance of the fuel in AGR-1.  However, the systematic 
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and disciplined approach to the design of the test train and to the development of the test train assembly 
procedures provides a basis for confidence that the problems encountered will be limited and manageable.  
Likewise, the care taken in specifying and fabricating the AGR-1 baseline fuel, and in selecting the AGR-
1 fuel variants to provide diversity in areas of primary uncertainty, provides a basis for confidence that at 
least one of the fuel types will perform at a level approaching VHTR requirements.  The primary 
objectives and multi-level success criteria for AGR-1 are addressed in this report.  Complete success at all 
levels is possible, but partial success, in combination with the experience gained and information 
developed to date would still represent a significant advance in the state of the art of TRISO-coated 
particle fuel in the US.  The fuel fabrication process developed for AGR-1 will be used to fabricate driver 
fuel for the fission product transport irradiations (AGR-3 and AGR-4); and the test train design, with 
adjustments and improvements based on the experience gained from AGR-1 fabrication and operation, 
will serve as the framework for the design, fabrication, and operation of test trains for future irradiations.  
Primary issues considered in the design, fabrication, and operation of the AGR-1 test train and in the 
selection and fabrication of the AGR-1 fuel, along with provisions for addressing the issues, are listed in 
Table ES-1 below.
Table ES-1 – Provisions for AGR-1 Design/Performance Issues 
Issue Provision Section/Page 
Test Train Design and Fabrication 
Internal leakage 
Qualified brazing procedure, helium flow to 
common gas volume 
5.1/13 
External leakage 
Quality assurance, ASME B31.1 and Section III 
welds, helium leak check 
5.1/14 
Differential thermal 
expansion
3-D thermal and structural analyses, sliding 
through-tube penetration 
5.1/14 
Thermocouple failures 
Testing of candidate thermocouples, diverse and 
redundant thermocouples with selective placement 
5.1/14 
Gas line failures Assembly mockups, flow checks 5.1/14 
Fission product monitor 
failure
A spare system that can be valved into any of the 
capsules is provided 
5.1/14 
Graphite fuel specimen 
holder cracking 
3-D thermal and structure analyses 5.1/15 
Chemical attack of fuel test 
articles
Capsule material selection and placement 5.1/15 
Temperature control during 
irradiation
Borated graphite in fuel specimen holder as 
burnable poison to limit power variation 
5.1/15 
Axial power variation 
Location in ATR core, reduction in boron 
concentrations in end capsules 
5.1/15 
Azimuthal power variation Hafnium shield in 240˚ sector facing ATR core 5.1/15 
Overpower during PALM 
cycles 
He-3 reduces period of concern, coordinated with 
ATR operations 
5.1/15 
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Issue Provision Section/Page 
Test train contamination 
following irradiation 
Procedure development to prevent moisture 
intrusion during test train removal from ATR 
5.1/15 
Fuel Selection and Fabrication 
General fuel failure 
mechanisms 
Development of fuel specifications, fabrication in 
compliance with QA program 
5.2/17 
Irradiation induced PyC 
dimensional changes 
IPyC coating condition/properties trade study, 
baseline/variants 1&2 diversity in IPyC 
conditions/properties 
5.2/17 
Uranium dispersion 
Investigation in IPyC study,  baseline/ 
variants 1, 2 &3 diversity in IPyC and SiC 
conditions/properties 
5.2/17 
Diffusive release of 
metallic fission products 
Diversity of SiC microstructure between baseline/ 
variants 1&2 and variant 3 
5.2/17 
SiC anomalies 
Specification reduction in defect fraction relative 
to prior fuels, process development to meet spec. 
5.2/18 
Impurity attack of SiC layer 
Limit impurities in kernel, compact and graphite 
fuel holder 
5.2/18 
Kernel migration 
UCO kernel, analysis to demonstrate acceptability 
of nonconformance with C/U specification 
5.2/18 
Pressure vessel failure 
UCO kernel, analysis to demonstrate acceptability 
of nonconformance with C/U specification 
5.2/18 
Operational Contingencies 
Drift of thermocouple 
indication within a capsule 
Use 3D thermal analysis, out-of-pile test results, 
multiple capsule thermocouple indications and 
trends to quantify.  Apply bias if being used as a 
control thermocouple 
6/19
Failure of thermocouple 
within a capsule 
Use 3D thermal analysis, remaining thermocouple 
indications, and prior capsule temperature data for 
continued temperature distribution.  If a control 
thermocouple, switch to functioning thermocouple 
with adjustment to setpoint 
6/19
Failure of all thermocouples 
within a capsule 
Use 3D thermal analysis, prior capsule 
temperature data, and temperature indications in 
adjacent capsules for continued temperature 
distribution.  Switch to manual control, use data 
from capsule fission product monitor for 
confirmation as appropriate. 
6/19
Change in test train internal 
leakage
Detect by monitoring common gas space and 
capsule flows and pressures.  Adjust gas flows to 
common space and affected capsule as necessary 
to mitigate and prevent cross-contamination. 
6/19
vIssue Provision Section/Page 
Capsule gas line failure 
Mitigation actions, in terms of adjustments to 
capsule and common space gas flow, and the 
impact of the failure would depend on the extent 
and location of the leak. 
6/20
Excessive fuel failures 
within a capsule 
Monitor for indications of cross-contamination in 
other capsules.  If necessary, increase helium 
fraction to affected capsule, decrease gas supply 
flow to affected capsule, and/or increase helium 
flow to common gas space. 
6/20
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AGR advanced gas reactor 
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NE DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology 
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NUCO natural (0.71% 235U) uranium mixture of UO2 and UC2
OPyC outer pyrolytic carbon coating in a TRISO particle 
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
PyC pyrolytic carbon 
SiC silicon carbide  
TRISO A multilayer coating, on a spherical kernel, made up of a low-density pyrocarbon 
(buffer) layer surrounded by an IPyC, surrounded by a SiC, surrounded by an OPyC 
UCO mixture of UO2 and UC2
US United States 
VHTR Very High Temperature Reactor 
11. INTRODUCTION 
The irradiation test train that is being designed and fabricated for AGR-1 will provide the capability to 
irradiate fuel in six individually controlled (for temperature) and monitored (for temperature and fission 
product gas release) capsules within a single location in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR).  This 
capability will allow the simultaneous irradiation and monitoring of up to six different fuel types or of a 
single fuel type at up to six different temperatures, or a combination of temperatures and fuel types.  In 
the early phase of the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification Program (AGR fuel 
program), this capability will be used to irradiate multiple fuel types in irradiation tests AGR-1 and AGR-
2 in order to strengthen the understanding of the relationships among fuel process conditions, fuel 
properties and irradiation performance; and to support the selection of a reference fuel for qualification.  
It will also efficiently support fission product transport model development by allowing irradiation of a 
single fuel type at varying temperatures in irradiation tests AGR-3 and AGR-4.  In the later phase of the 
program, the multicapsule capability will support irradiation of a single fuel type at varying temperatures 
to support fuel qualification (AGR-5 and AGR-6), and to demonstrate fuel performance margins and 
validate fuel performance and fission product transport models (AGR-7 and AGR-8).  This multicapsule 
capability parallels the capability established in the Petten reactor (European Union) and the IVV-2M 
reactor (Russian Federation), enhancing the international status of the ATR as a high temperature reactor 
fuel irradiation facility. 
A primary objective of the AGR-1 irradiation is the shakedown of the multi-capsule test train design.  
Establishment of this multi-capsule irradiation capability is essential for execution of the AGR fuel 
program and it will also provide an attractive option for high temperature reactor fuel irradiation by other 
US or international programs.  The irradiation is planned to begin in the first quarter of FY 2007 and 
continue for up to two and a half years.  This report provides an overview of the AGR-1 irradiation, 
which is the first of a series of eight irradiations planned for the AGR fuel program.  The development of 
an overall plan for the program and the context for the AGR-1 irradiation are briefly summarized in a 
background discussion in section 2. 
Section 3 provides a summary description of the AGR-1 irradiation, including location in the ATR and 
the in-reactor and ex-reactor components of the test train.  Fuel types included in the six capsules are 
discussed along with predicted irradiation conditions. 
A set of objectives for the design, fabrication and operation of the AGR-1 test train and for the selection 
and fabrication of the fuel are described in section 4.  These objectives form the basis for a set of 
progressively more challenging success criteria for the test train and for the fuel. 
Section 5 describes the steps taken to manage and mitigate the risks presented by the AGR-1 test train and 
fuel, with regard to meeting the objectives discussed earlier.  The test train is addressed in terms of 
potential problems that are likely to be encountered by a first-of-a-kind design under the challenging 
constraints and conditions of AGR-1, and the design provisions that have been included to mitigate these 
problems.  Fuel is addressed in terms of the specification and fabrication of the baseline fuel and variants 
to maximize the potential for successful performance of at least one fuel type. 
Section 6 discusses contingency options for mitigation of problems that could be encountered in the 
course of AGR-1 operation.  The problems considered include both failures of test train components and 
excessive fuel failures within one or more capsules. 
22. BACKGROUND 
The first major effort of the AGR Fuel Development and Qualification Program was a detailed technical 
planning activity to identify the scope required to develop and qualify a TRISO-coated particle fuel that 
could meet the operational and safety requirements of a very-high-temperature gas-cooled reactor 
(VHTR).  In the absence of a VHTR reactor design, the fuel requirements were drawn from pre-
conceptual design documentation for the Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR).  In an initial 
meeting at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in May 2002, working groups were formed in the areas of 
fuel manufacture, fuel and materials irradiation, safety testing and postirradiation examination, fuel 
performance modeling, and fission product transport and source term.  Each working group drafted a 
portion of Revision 0 of the Technical Program Plan1.  The drafts were reviewed and discussed in a 
meeting at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in August 2002, leading to an initial draft of the 
overall plan.  In those discussions, the challenge of designing and fabricating a multi-capsule fuel 
irradiation test train to be inserted in ATR and the potential for problems with operation of a first-of-a-
kind design were recognized.  Thus it was agreed that the primary objective of the first irradiation, 
designated AGR-1, would be to shake down the test train, i.e., test the AGR-1 capsules, test train and 
pertinent equipment under operating conditions to determine possible faults and defects, and to 
familiarize the ATR staff with its operation and control. 
AGR-1 was identified as a “shakedown/early fuel” irradiation, and considerations associated with 
including a shakedown irradiation in the series of irradiations to be conducted were discussed in section 
D.4 of the Technical Program Plan1.  The AGR-1 test, as envisioned in revision 0 of the plan, was 
described as follows (bold text added to illustrate important elements changed in revision 12):
This multicell capsule will include compacts made from early small-coater particles, possible 
compacts made from German particles, as well as possible unbonded particles and material 
samples. This will provide experience with multicell capsule design, fabrication, and operation, 
and it will reduce the chances of capsule or cell failures in subsequent capsules. If successfully 
taken to a substantial fraction of design burnup and fast fluence, it will provide early data on 
irradiated fuel performance. These early data on performance of fuel variants would support the 
development of a fundamental understanding of the relationship between the fuel fabrication 
process and fuel product properties and irradiation performance.
The approach envisioned was to include early small-coater particles and possibly German particles 
primarily as a prototypical heat source for the shakedown of the irradiation test train.  Limited 
characterization of the early particles was envisioned to minimize cost and schedule. 
As fuel development work progressed in conjunction with implementation of NQA-1 (2000) quality 
assurance requirements, the objective related to the development of a better understanding of the 
relationship between aspects of the fuel fabrication process, fuel product properties and irradiation 
performance took on a greater importance. This led to the development of a rigorous full scope 
characterization capability to assess compliance with a detailed specification for AGR-1 fuel3.  The AGR-
1 irradiation description was adjusted in revision 1 of the Technical Program Plan2 to read as follows 
(bold text added to illustrate important elements changed in revision 1): 
This multi-monitor test train will include compacts made from particles produced in a small-
coater in conjunction with fuel process development. This irradiation will provide experience 
with multi-monitor test train design, fabrication, and operation, and will reduce the chances of 
test train or capsule failures in subsequent test trains. If successfully taken to a substantial 
fraction of design burnup and fast fluence, it will provide data on irradiated fuel performance for
baseline and fuel variants selected based on data from fuel process development and existing 
irradiation experience. These early data on performance of fuel variants could support the 
selection of a reference fuel as well as development of fundamental understanding of the 
3relationship between the fuel fabrication process, fuel product properties, and irradiation 
performance. 
In addition to the substantial changes bolded above, the nomenclature was changed (cell to capsule and 
capsule to test train) to achieve a definition consistent with conventional ATR terminology throughout 
program documentation. 
In the original plan, program participants hoped to obtain some limited fuel performance data from 
AGR-1 (albeit as a second priority for the irradiation), but development of a fundamental understanding 
of the relationship between the fuel fabrication process, fuel product properties, and irradiation 
performance was considered to be primarily part of the scope of the coating scaleup activities culminating 
in the AGR-2 irradiation test.  However, given the technical challenges associated with scaleup of the 
fabrication process, the AGR fuel program decided that obtaining early data from AGR-1 fuel fabrication 
and irradiation to demonstrate the viability of using German-type coatings on UCO kernels and to 
enhance the understanding of the relationship between the fuel fabrication process, the fuel product 
properties, and irradiation performance would be highly desirable.   These changes substantially expanded 
the scope of fuel fabrication and characterization methods development required for the production of 
AGR-1 fuel.  They also substantially expanded the potential value of the results of the AGR-1 irradiation, 
placing greater emphasis on performance of the fuel, which will help guide process development efforts 
and fuel specification evolution during coating scaleup and fabrication of the AGR-2 fuel.  Thus while the 
shakedown of the test train design remains a primary objective, the objective of producing fuel 
performance data of value for reference fuel selection and for improving the understanding of coated 
particle fuel performance has greatly increased in importance.  It is also now intended that the AGR-1 
irradiation will provide irradiated samples for early safety testing (i.e., accident condition simulation tests) 
with results to be used in making a decision to proceed with fabrication of qualification test fuel for 
irradiation tests AGR-5 and AGR-6 prior to the availability of safety test data from AGR-2.
43. AGR-1 DESCRIPTION 
The AGR-1 irradiation is expected to begin in the first quarter of FY07 and, if totally successful, to 
continue for approximately two and a half years.  The irradiation will be conducted in the ATR reactor at 
the Idaho National Laboratory in the B-10 irradiation location in the beryllium reflector, one of the large 
“B” holes as indicated in Figure 3-1.  The in-reactor components of the experiment, designated the 
irradiation test train, will provide a thermal and materials irradiation environment representative of that in 
a high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) core.  In addition, the experiment will be placed in a 
position within the ATR where the neutron spectrum is representative of HTGR conditions.  This is 
important because irradiation performance depends upon both the fast fluence, which affects material 
properties and behavior, and the thermal fluence, which determines the fuel burnup. Furthermore, past US 
irradiations have been substantially accelerated in fast and thermal fluence, which can have a deleterious 
impact on fuel performance. Thus for the AGR program, irradiations will be much closer to real time to 
minimize the potential for poor fuel performance because of acceleration effects.  
Large “B” hole
(4 locations)
The majority of AGR
Irradiations will 
be placed in one
of these locations
Figure 3-1.  Advanced Test Reactor Plan View. 
53.1 Irradiation Test Train 
The AGR-1 irradiation test train, shown in Figure 3-2, will contain six individual stainless steel enclosed 
capsules, each approximately 1-3/8 inches (35 mm) in diameter and 6 inches (152 mm) long.  The 
capsules will be welded end to end to form a cylinder 36 inches (914 mm) long.  A spacer and end cap 
attached to the bottom will result in a total assembled length of approximately 43 inches (1092 mm).  A 
lead-out tube attached to the top will hold the assembly in position in the ATR core and contain and 
protect the gas lines and thermocouples extending from the test train to the reactor penetration.  Each 
capsule will contain twelve fuel compacts that are approximately 0.5 in. (12.7 mm) in diameter by 1 in. 
(25.4 mm) long.  Each capsule will be independently supplied with a flowing mixture of helium and neon 
gases, which have substantially different thermal conductivities.  Temperature control for each capsule 
will be accomplished by adjusting the mixture ratio of the two gases. Temperature control gas exhaust 
lines will transport fission products released from the fuel compacts within a capsule to the fission 
product monitor for that capsule, which will be capable of detecting individual particle failures, up to at 
least 250 particle failures in a single capsule, and measuring the rate of release of specific gaseous 
isotopes of interest.  If required, He-3, which has a very large thermal neutron absorption cross section, 
can be used to limit power and temperature during an occasional higher power operating mode of the 
ATR referred to as a PALM cycle.   
Figure 3-2.   AGR Irradiation Test Train. 
A cross section of a capsule in the test train is shown in Figure 3-3.  The thermocouples and gas lines for 
lower capsules are routed in “through-tubes”.  These tubes are brazed to the capsule top plate and 
penetrate the capsule bottom plate via a sliding seal.  Gas line and thermocouple lead penetrations are 
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6brazed to the capsule top plate.  The gas supply line terminates near the bottom of the capsule while the 
return line terminates near the top to facilitate sweeping of the capsule with the helium/neon gas mixture.  
Multiple thermocouples are provided for each capsule, with junction locations varying axially and radially, 
and differing thermocouple types located in accordance with their temperature limitations.  Flux wires 
and melt wires will be encapsulated in vanadium and inserted into each graphite fuel holder from the 
bottom. 
Figure 3-3.  AGR Irradiation Capsule Cross Section. 
3.2 Fuel Specimens 
All of the fuel particles and compacts within a given capsule have been fabricated to the same 
specification.  The contents of each of the capsules, numbered consecutively from the bottom to the top, 
will be as follows (all variant specifications will be identical to baseline fuel with the exceptions noted 
below):
x Capsule 6 – Baseline fuel specified with the intent of maximizing the prospects of successful 
performance. 
x Capsule 5 – Variant 1 fuel containing an inner pyrocarbon layer produced at an increased temperature. 
ATR Core 
Center
Graphite
Fuel Compact Gas Lines
Thermocouples
Hf
SST Shroud 
Stack
Stack
Stack
7x Capsule 4 – Variant 3 fuel containing a silicon carbide layer produced at a reduced temperature with a 
mixture of argon and hydrogen. 
x Capsule 3 – Baseline fuel. 
x Capsule 2 – Variant 2 fuel containing an inner pyrocarbon layer produced with an increased coating 
gas ratio. 
x Capsule 1 – Variant 3 fuel. 
Representative cross sections from each of the four batches comprising the baseline fuel particle 
composite are shown in Figure 3-4 a.  Dimensional checking of a baseline fuel compact is shown in 
Figure 3-4 b.  Sufficient quantities of particles and compacts for each type were produced to allow for 
characterization requirements, loading the capsule, spares, and archived material. 
a. Particle Cross Sections b. Compact Dimension Measurement
Figure 3-4.  AGR-1 Baseline Fuel. 
Additional definition and discussion of the rationale behind the selection of the fuel types for the six 
capsules is addressed in section 6.2. 
3.3 Irradiation Conditions 
In the absence of a Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) design and core temperature analyses, and 
recognizing that the NGNP program has chosen the GT-MHR design as the starting point for further 
reactor development, GT-MHR design service conditions were used to establish the AGR-1 irradiation 
conditions.  The following irradiation conditions are specified for AGR-14:
x The instantaneous peak temperature for each capsule shall be  1400 ˚C.
x The time average, peak temperature for each capsule shall be  1250 ˚C.
x The time average, volume average temperature for each capsule shall be 1150 +30/-75˚C.
8x The minimum compact average burnup for each fuel compact shall be > 14 % FIMA. 
x The compact average burnup goal for the majority of the fuel compacts should be > 18 % FIMA. 
x The maximum peak fast neutron fluence for each fuel compact shall be < 5 x 1025 n/m2, E>0.18 
MeV.
x The minimum peak fast neutron fluence for each fuel compact shall be > 1.5 x 1025 n/m2, E>0.18 
MeV.
x The instantaneous peak power per particle shall be  400 mW/particle. 
Detailed 3-D neutronics and thermal models of the in-core portion of the AGR-1 test train were developed 
to support the experiment design.  Representative results of design calculations of irradiation conditions 
for AGR-1 are shown in Figures 3-5 through 3-9.  A pretest prediction will be performed prior to 
beginning the irradiation utilizing the final fuel compact and capsule parameters.  Pretest predictions will 
also include calculation of fuel behavior using the INL fuel performance code, PARFUME.  The 
neutronics, thermal and fuel performance models will also be available to support the operation of AGR-1.   
Figure 3-5.  Calculated Fast Fluence (E > 0.18 MeV). 
9Figure 3-6.  Calculated Burnup. 
Figure 3-7.  Volume and Time Averaged Fuel Temperature . 
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Figure 3-8.  Temperature (˚F) in Graphite Holder, Capsule 4, 280 EFPD. 
Figure 3-9.  Temperature (˚F), Fuel Stack 3, Capsule 4, 280 EFPD.
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4. AGR-1 OBJECTIVES AND SUCCESS CRITERIA 
As noted earlier, AGR-1 is directed toward irradiation test train design, fabrication, and shakedown 
operation, plus gaining fuel fabrication experience and irradiation data with small coater fuel.  The major 
objectives and related success criteria for the test train and fuel are provided in this section. 
4.1 Objectives 
4.1.1 Test Train Design, Fabrication and Operation 
Detailed technical and functional requirements for the AGR-1 experiment were developed and 
documented5, 6  Test train design and fabrication address the following major objectives: 
x Provide multiple independently controlled and monitored fuel capsules 
x For each capsule, provide an environment representative of VHTR service conditions 
- Thermal (temperatures within specified limits) 
- Chemical (helium/neon gas mixture, impurity levels and moisture levels within specified 
limits, protect fuel compacts from migration of elements from metallic capsule 
components) 
- Neutronics (local power within specified limits, with representative neutron energy 
spectrum) 
x Maintain integrity for a sufficient duration to achieve specified fuel burnup and fast fluence 
targets
x Protect the fuel test articles during fabrication, insertion, irradiation, removal and disassembly of 
the test train. 
4.1.2 Fuel Fabrication and Performance 
Detailed specifications for the fuel types to be included in AGR-1 were developed and documented3.  The 
specification and fabrication of AGR-1 fuel address the following major objectives: 
x Produce a baseline fuel with characteristics selected to maximize potential for successful 
irradiation performance based on existing fuel performance data 
x Produce variant fuels with characteristics selected to address major uncertainties in the 
performance of the baseline fuel 
x Characterize baseline and variant fuels to demonstrate compliance with as-manufactured quality 
requirements 
x Demonstrate maintenance of fuel integrity and retention of gaseous and metallic fission products*
to levels approaching anticipated VHTR requirements for normal operation and accident 
conditions in at least one fuel type. 
4.2 Success Criteria 
A series of success criteria are defined below that represent an increasing level of success for the AGR-1 
irradiation in terms of test train shakedown and fuel performance.  The criteria are limited to in-pile 
                                                     
* The term “fission product” is intended to include fission product daughters and activation products. 
12
operation and test train disassembly and inspection, not including postirradiation examination and safety 
testing of the fuel, which will be defined later. 
4.2.1 Test Train Design, Fabrication and Operation 
1. Insertion of the test train in ATR and startup with normal indications on all measured parameters. 
(partial test train shakedown) 
2. Operation through at least the first two ATR cycles, with subsequent termination and removal 
from ATR because of test train limitations that can be resolved by defined design modifications.  
(partial test train shakedown) 
3. Operation through the first half of the planned duration, with subsequent termination and removal 
from ATR because of test train limitations that can be resolved by defined design modifications. 
(test train shakedown) 
4. Operation for the planned duration with identified test train limitations that can be resolved by 
defined design modifications. (test train shakedown plus partial design validation) 
5. Operation for the planned duration meeting the AGR-1 test specification requirements4, and 
successful removal of the test train from ATR without damage to the contents.  (test train design 
validation)
4.2.2 Fuel Fabrication and Performance 
1. Production of baseline and variant fuel test articles meeting AGR-1 specification requirements 
with minor exceptions addressed by nonconformance reports. (reestablishment of fuel fabrication 
capability) 
2. Initial operation of one or more capsules with Kr85m R/B  2.0x10-6. (confirmation of initial fuel 
quality as determined by gaseous fission product retention) 
3. Operation of one or more capsules beyond a fast fluence of 1.5x1025 n/m2 with Kr85m R/B 
4.0x10-6 and  5 particle failures as indicated by spikes in the gross fission product monitor 
output. (indication of successful mitigation of irradiation shrinkage induced failures) 
4. Operation of one or more capsules to burnup  15% FIMA with Kr85m R/B  4.0x10-6 and  5 
particle failures as indicated by spikes in the gross fission product monitor output. (confirmation 
of fuel performance as determined by gaseous fission product retention) 
5. Postirradiation metallic fission product release and safety test performance criteria to be 
developed in conjunction with detailed planning of the postirradiation examination and safety 
testing activities. (confirmation of fuel performance as determined by metallic fission product 
retention)
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5. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Design and fabrication of the AGR-1 test train present many technical challenges that could cause 
problems during fabrication, insertion, startup, operation and withdrawal.  In order to maximize the 
amount of fuel contained in a capsule to meet statistical requirements for later irradiations, three columns 
of 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) diameter fuel compacts are placed in a triangular array within a cylinder with an 
outer diameter of 1 3/8 inches (35 mm).  The addition of gas supply and return lines, multiple 
thermocouples and fluence monitors for each individual capsule within the limited available space 
presents difficult design, fabrication and assembly challenges.  Test train assembly involves brazing gas 
lines, thermocouple leads and thru tubes to capsule top heads, and welding together individual capsules to 
form the pressure boundary with an absolutely straight configuration to allow for proper insertion, 
operation and removal.  Routing of thermocouple leads and gas lines through the stacked capsules that 
form the test train must be accomplished without damage during assembly.  The AGR-1 irradiation 
duration and operating environment exceeds the proven capability of commercially available 
thermocouples.  Differential thermal expansion associated with dissimilar materials and large temperature 
variations within capsules must be accommodated. 
HRB-21, the most recent US low enriched uranium (LEU) coated particle fuel irradiation, substantially 
exceeded expected particle failure and fission product release levels7, 8.  Following production of the 
HRB-21 fuel in the late 1980s, no LEU coated particle fuel had been fabricated in the US, and the fuel 
production facility in which the HRB-21 fuel was fabricated was dismantled.  It had also been generally 
recognized that performance of TRISO-coated particle fuel at the levels required for current reactor 
designs cannot be inferred from established product characterization methods alone.  Thus, production of 
the AGR-1 fuel required re-establishment of US fuel fabrication and characterization capability without 
clear definition of the process conditions and product characteristics that would lead to successful fuel 
performance. 
The extent of the challenges presented has been recognized by AGR program participants during the 
planning and conduct of work leading up to the AGR-1 irradiation.  Actions taken by the AGR fuel 
program to identify and manage these risks and maximize the prospects for successful results from AGR-
1 are summarized below. 
5.1. Test Train Design and Fabrication 
Test train design, fabrication and operational challenges were recognized during initial program planning, 
and were the basis for identifying shakedown of the test train design as a primary objective of AGR-1.  
Many of the potential problems that might be encountered were identified in discussions regarding the 
need for a shakedown capsule, as noted in section B.4.3 of the original plan1 and subsequently during 
multiple test train design reviews.  Potential test train limitations and failure modes, and provisions for 
addressing them are noted below. 
x Internal leakage – A failure in a brazed capsule penetration could lead to leakage from the capsule 
into the common gas volume within the test train.  This leakage could cause cross contamination 
of the capsule exhaust gas and loss of individual monitoring capability.  To address this concern, , 
extensive development efforts have been directed toward qualifying brazing methods to produce 
high quality and high integrity brazes for the capsule penetrations. Also, the common gas volume 
comprised of the spaces between capsules, inside the capsule through-tubes and the lead-out tube 
has been designed so it can be supplied with helium held at a pressure slightly higher than the 
pressure in the capsules.  Thus leakage would be pure helium into the capsules and cross-
contamination would be avoided. 
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x External leakage – A leak in the external pressure boundary would allow moisture to enter the test 
train.  If the leak occurs in the space between capsules, e.g. in a circumferential weld joining the 
capsules, all of the test train components could be exposed to high moisture levels.  With 
extensive use of refractory metals to withstand elevated temperatures and protect the fuel 
specimens from chemical attack, high moisture levels would rapidly degrade the test train 
capability.  The limited space precludes use of a double containment for the test train, so the test 
train pressure boundary must be fabricated to a very high quality level.  A new automated welder 
will be used to perform the capsule welds and extensive mockups and test welds were performed 
to qualify the equipment and procedure.  All of the welds will be visually inspected and subjected 
to liquid penetrant testing to assure weld integrity and the assembly will be helium leak checked.  
All of these welds will meet the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
Section 3 Class III welds. Experiment safety analyses will include leaks in the pressure boundary 
to assure that they would not present a safety concern. 
x Differential thermal expansion – Differential thermal expansion resulting from dissimilar 
materials and temperature variations within the test train can produce high localized stresses and 
cyclic conditions that can lead to component distortion or failure.  Detailed thermal and stress 
analyses of the design were performed to identify and assess potential problem areas.  The 
through-tubes that penetrate the capsules and serve as conduits for routing of gas lines and 
thermocouple leads were identified as having high stresses if brazed at both ends of the capsule.  
To address this concern the tubes will only be brazed at the top and will pass though low 
clearance openings at the bottom.  In addition, the use of Mo for the through-tubes, a high 
strength refractory should provide margin against any potential high stresses leading to excessive 
deformation and/or failure.  The provision for accommodating internal leakage discussed earlier 
will support a small helium in-leakage to each of the capsules through the bottom through-tube 
penetrations.
x Thermocouple failures – The combination of spatial constraints, irradiation conditions, material 
requirements, temperatures and durations of AGR-1 significantly exceed the nominal capabilities 
of commercially available thermocouples.  INL has conducted long-term elevated-temperature 
testing of candidate commercial thermocouples and high-temperature thermocouples developed at 
INL.  While reinforcing concerns about thermocouple drift, no complete failures were observed 
and the results provided a basis for selection of thermocouples to be used and their likely 
performance.  Using these results and test train thermal analyses, INL has specified several types, 
including commercial thermocouples and thermocouples developed at INL, to be placed at 
specific locations based on expected local temperature conditions and thermocouple performance 
capabilities, with multiple thermocouples provided for each capsule.  
x Gas line failures – Leaks or blockages in a capsule gas supply or return line could impede the 
ability to control temperature and monitor gas release from the capsule.  The gas lines are small 
(~1/16” diameter) and must be fed through the relatively congested capsule through-tubes and out 
the lead-out tube.  Test train mockups are being used to gain experience with the different parts of 
the assembly, with attention to controlling the minimum gas line and thermocouple lead bend 
radii to prevent kinking during assembly.  Flow capability will be checked during test train 
assembly. 
x Fission product monitor failure – A fission product monitoring system is provided for each 
capsule to measure the release of fission products during irradiation.  If a monitoring system fails, 
key data from that capsule would be lost.  The fission product monitoring system design provides 
for a seventh spare system that can be valved in to replace the failed system. 
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x Graphite fuel specimen holder cracking – The graphite between fuel compacts and between fuel 
compacts and through-tubes is thin due to space limitations and could be subject to cracking 
during the irradiation.  Depending on the location and extent of cracking, the gap between the 
holder and the capsule wall could be altered, changing the heat transfer characteristics of the 
capsule.  Analysis results indicate that the fuel compact should shrink more than the fuel holder, 
precluding failure due to differential shrinkage. 
x Chemical attack of fuel test articles – Material investigations have indicated that if stainless steel 
or Inconel is in direct contact with graphite at elevated temperature, carbides of iron, nickel or 
chromium can migrate through the graphite into the fuel compact and attack the fuel particle 
silicon carbide (SiC) layer.  In order to avoid this problem, stainless steel or Inconel components 
in the elevated temperature regions of the capsules have been replaced or sheathed by refractory 
metals (Mo or Nb). 
x Temperature control during irradiation – The use of ~19.8% enriched fuel, as compared with 
mixtures of fissile and fertile particles or lower enriched German fuel, produces a larger reduction 
in power during the irradiation due to U235 depletion and lower buildup of plutonium.  The large 
power swing during irradiation would limit the ability to maintain fuel temperatures at desired 
levels.  To flatten the power production, borated graphite was specified for the graphite specimen 
holder in the capsules.  The initial power level is substantially reduced, and depletion of the boron 
leads to a manageable power variation with peak power occurring between one third and one half 
of the way through the irradiation. 
x Axial power variation – Typical axial power distributions fall off significantly at the top and 
bottom.  The ATR axial thermal flux distribution is relatively flat in the center 30 inches (76.2 
cm) of the core.  Additional flattening is obtained by reducing the graphite fuel holder boron 
concentrations in the top and bottom capsules. 
x Azimuthal power variation – The AGR-1 test train is located in an irradiation hole in the ATR 
reflector, resulting in a significant neutron flux gradient.  In order to flatten the azimuthal power 
variation, a thin hafnium sheet acting as a thermal neutron filter covering a 240˚ sector facing the 
core has been installed in each capsule, while the back 120˚  sector uses a stainless steel segment. 
x Overpower during PALM cycles – In order to meet the needs of another irradiation client, the 
ATR is periodically operated in what is referred to as a “PALM cycle” mode.  In this mode, the 
core power level and resulting thermal neutron flux at the AGR-1 test train location is 
substantially higher.  If a PALM cycle occurs near the time of peak power during the AGR-1 
irradiation, maximum temperature limits could be exceeded.  To limit the power in the capsules 
during a PALM cycle, provisions have been made to use He-3 in place of normal helium.  The 
high thermal neutron absorption coefficient of He-3 will reduce the power to acceptable levels if 
a PALM cycle were to be conducted during a portion of the AGR-1 irradiation period of concern.  
The program will work with ATR operations to attempt to avoid having a PALM cycle during the 
remaining period. 
x Test train contamination following irradiation – Transfer of the test train from the reactor to the 
canal following irradiation will require cutting the lead-out tube and handling the test train under 
water.  This introduces the possibility of moisture intrusion and degradation of the contents prior 
to disassembly.  Substantial efforts have been directed toward establishing procedures to prevent 
moisture intrusion during the cutting process and effectively sealing the tube to prevent intrusion 
in subsequent handling. 
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The AGR-1 test train design builds upon the successful design, assembly, and operation of capsules built 
by INL for previous ATR customers. Many of these challenges have been encountered individually and 
successfully overcome in other similar types of irradiation capsules developed at INL in the past. The 
challenge for AGR-1 is that the test train contains many of these challenges simultaneously and under 
conditions (time, temperature, fluence) that exceed previous fuel irradiation experience in ATR. 
5.2. Fuel Selection and Fabrication 
As noted earlier, the AGR-1 test train has been designed to provide six separately controlled and 
monitored capsules containing fuel specimens.  This capability allows for simultaneous irradiation of 
multiple fuel types, or simultaneous irradiation of a given fuel type at multiple temperatures.  For AGR-1, 
this capability will be used to irradiate multiple fuel types with the objective of maximizing the prospects 
of successful performance by at least one fuel, as well as to provide insights into the relationship of key 
coating process conditions and material properties to fuel performance.  A baseline fuel has been 
specified and produced with the intent of providing the greatest potential for successful performance, and 
variants (same specification as baseline fuel with the exception of a primary process condition and related 
properties) have been specified to provide diversity in the areas considered to present the greatest risk of 
unsuccessful performance of the baseline fuel.  The selection of the baseline and variant fuel 
specifications are briefly summarized in the following discussion. 
Prior to the start of the AGR fuel program extensive reviews of fabrication, irradiation and safety testing 
of US and German fuel had been conducted9, 10.  The results of these studies and discussions among the 
AGR fuel program participants resulted in the set of fuel failure mechanisms and associated fuel 
properties identified in Table 3.2 of the Technical Program Plan1. This review and discussions among 
program participants were primary input for establishing revision 0 of the AGR-1 fuel specification, 
which has evolved to reflect additional understandings gained through subsequent fuel fabrication process 
and characterization methods development3.  The fuel specification was predicated upon use of the UCO 
kernel to achieve the performance requirements of the VHTR while producing coatings that to the extent 
possible replicated the coatings developed and successfully irradiated in the German program.  As fuel 
characterization methods were reestablished early in the program, representative high performance 
German fuel particles11 and fissile particles from the poorly performing composite irradiated in HRB-2112
were characterized.  The AGR program considered these inputs and other reference material on coated 
particle fuel performance to identify failure mechanisms and related fuel properties that presented the 
greatest uncertainty and risk with regard to successful fuel performance. 
As a result of these considerations, particular emphasis was placed on irradiation induced dimensional 
changes in the inner pyrocarbon layer (IPyC), and the resulting induced stresses and potential for 
IPyC/SiC layer debonding and cracking of the IPyC and SiC layers.  The primary measured pyrocarbon 
properties associated with these phenomena are anisotropy, density, and surface connected porosity.  It 
was also recognized that process conditions and properties that led to increased irradiation stability could 
also lead to increased permeability and dispersion of uranium from the kernel into the buffer and IPyC 
layers during SiC coating and compact heat treatment.  During irradiation the dispersed uranium could 
lead to chemical attack and degradation of the SiC layer.  Thus identification of an optimum IPyC process 
and product specification involved a tradeoff between these two concerns.  In the course of coating 
process development at ORNL, an experimental study was conducted on the effects of process conditions 
on these IPyC properties13.  The results of this study were used to establish IPyC process conditions and 
properties for the baseline fuel (adjusted slightly to accommodate subsequent additional process 
development results).  Since IPyC performance and attaining an optimum tradeoff between dimensional 
stability and uranium dispersion was a primary concern, the IPyC study results were also used to define 
variants 1 and 2, providing diversity of fuel types directly addressing this tradeoff. 
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Another area of concern with regard to fuel performance was silicon carbide microstructure.  SiC layers 
of earlier US fuel, which was produced at higher coating temperatures, exhibited large columnar grains 
(radial dimensions approaching the thickness of the SiC layer), while German SiC contained smaller more 
symmetric grains.  There is concern that larger columnar grains may be more susceptible to chemical 
attack and metallic fission product diffusion along the grain boundaries.  Thus the SiC coating conditions 
for the baseline and variants 1 and 2 were derived from German conditions available in the open literature.  
Since SiC performance in terms of resistance to chemical attack and retention of metallic fission products 
was also considered an element of significant risk, achieving diversity in the SiC microstructure was the 
basis for specifying variant 3.  A mixture of hydrogen and argon carrier gas was used in the SiC coating 
for variant 3, as compared to a pure hydrogen carrier gas in the baseline and variants 1 and 2.  In 
conjunction with this change, the SiC coating temperature was reduced, consistent with ORNL 
developmental results for SiC coating using a mixture of hydrogen and argon14.  In addition to providing 
diversity in the SiC microstructure, variant 3 is also expected to have less uranium dispersion in the buffer 
and IPyC than the baseline fuel due to the lower SiC coating temperature.  
It was also recognized that OPyC failures, induced by propagation of failures from the low density 
pyrocarbon outer layer in the TRISO-P particle design used in HRB-21, were likely a contributing factor 
in the observed poor performance.   Thus the outer low density pyrocarbon layer of the HRB-21 particle 
design was eliminated. 
The program has conducted a systematic fuel fabrication process development effort.  Surrogate particles 
were obtained from commercial suppliers and depleted uranium oxide (DUO2), natural uranium 
oxycarbide (NUCO) and low enriched uranium oxycarbide (LEU UCO) kernels were fabricated to 
support the development effort.  The surrogate and DUO2 kernels were used for early coating process 
development and later supplementary efforts, while the NUCO and DUO2 kernels were used for later 
stage coating process development and LEU UCO was used for production of particles for AGR-1.  The 
LEU UCO kernels produced by BWXT15 were characterized16 and used to produce coated particles for 
AGR-114 which were  then characterized17, 18, 19,20 to assure compliance with the AGR-1 fuel specification3.
Potential fuel failure mechanisms and provisions for addressing them are noted below. 
x General failure mechanisms as identified in Table 3.2 of the Technical Program Plan1 – This was 
addressed in general terms by the review of coated particle fuel performance9 and incorporation 
of the results into the AGR-1 fuel specification3. Subsequent production of AGR-1 fuel was 
performed in compliance with the ORNL QA program. 
x IPyC and/or SiC structural failures caused by irradiation induced dimensional changes in the 
pyrocarbon – Addressing this failure mechanism was a primary focus of adjustments to the AGR-
1 baseline fuel IPyC and OPyC process and property specifications, based on results of the IPyC 
study.  Specification of changes to IPyC process conditions for variants 1 and 2, also based on 
results of the IPyC study, to provide diversity of IPyC properties (density, anisotropy, surface 
connected porosity) that are related to irradiation induced dimensional change. 
x SiC attack resulting from uranium dispersed in buffer and IPyC layers – The IPyC study included 
an investigation of the relationship of IPyC deposition conditions to IPyC permeability and 
uranium dispersion, and the results were factored into the specification of AGR-1 baseline and 
variants 1 and 2 fuel.  Variant 3, with baseline IPyC conditions, used a reduced SiC coating 
temperature, which may reduce uranium dispersion during coating.  Also, differences in the 
variant 3 SiC microstructure resulting from the use of an argon/hydrogen carrier gas mixture in 
conjunction with a reduced coating temperature may reduce its susceptibility to attack by fission 
products produced by the dispersed uranium as noted below. 
x Diffusion of metallic fission products through the SiC layer – As noted above, differences in 
variant 3 SiC coating conditions, relative to those used for the baseline and variants 1 and 2, 
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produced a significantly different SiC microstructure.  This difference in SiC microstructure may 
reduce the susceptibility of the SiC layer to fission product attack and metallic fission product 
diffusion along grain boundaries, providing important diversity among the fuel types with regard 
to this release mechanism. 
x SiC anomalies – Anomalies at the IPyC/SiC interface or within the SiC can include soot 
inclusions or microstructure interruptions associated with particle bed fluidization during coating.  
Soot inclusions, often termed “gold spots” because of their effect on the surface appearance of the 
SiC layer, have been observed historically at percent levels and higher.  While there is no clear 
evidence that these anomalies cause particle failures, concerns about possible effects led to the 
specification of a maximum gold spot fraction of 10-3 at 95% confidence.  Initial LEU UCO 
particle batches failed to meet this specification, and considerable process development effort was 
expended to reach compliance for all the AGR-1 fuel types.  Since the characteristics of some of 
the observed anomalies differed from those typically observed in past US coated particle fuel, 
additional analyses were conducted to assess their failure probability21, indicating expectations of 
acceptable performance. 
x Impurity attack of SiC layer – Attack of the SiC layer by impurities, particularly iron inclusions 
in the compact matrix, has been observed in prior irradiations.  The AGR-1 fuel specification3
addressed this issue through maximum impurity limits for the kernels and compacts, and the 
AGR-1 design requirements5 and material specifications22 provided impurity limits for the 
graphite fuel holders.  The kernels were found to be within the specifications15, while compact 
impurity results are not yet available as of the writing of this report.  Initial results for the graphite 
fuel holder material found it to significantly exceed the impurity limit, and efforts are ongoing to 
address this issue by a combination of reduction of the impurities and justification of a 
nonconformance if necessary.
x Kernel migration – Migration of the kernel under a temperature gradient within the particle could 
bring the kernel in contact with the SiC layer resulting in particle failure.  Experimental and 
analytical investigations have shown that a UCO kernel is not subject to kernel migration if 
sufficient carbon is present.  Characterization of the kernels used in the production of AGR-1 fuel 
indicated that the lower limit of the one-sided 95%/99% tolerance interval of the C/U ratio was 
0.157, less than the specification minimum lower limit of 0.2.  This nonconformance with the 
AGR-1 specification was analyzed by INL23 and is not expected to present a problem with regard 
to kernel migration even if C/U were zero.
x Pressure vessel failure – Release of fission product gases into the buffer, in combination with 
production of CO due to excess oxygen released by fissioning in the kernel, could lead to over 
pressurization and failure of the particle pyrocarbon and silicon carbide layers.  Experimental and 
analytical investigations have shown that carbon in a UCO kernel mitigates excess oxygen and 
CO formation if sufficient carbon is present.  Characterization of the kernels used in the 
production of AGR-1 fuel indicated that the lower limit of the one-sided 95%/99% tolerance 
interval of the C/U ratio was 0.157, less than the specification minimum lower limit of 0.2.  This 
nonconformance with the AGR-1 specification was analyzed by INL23 and is not expected to 
present a problem with regard to pressure vessel failure even if C/U were as low as 0.1.
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6. OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCIES 
As discussed in the previous section, the design and fabrication of the AGR-1 test train and fuel 
specimens have presented many technical challenges.  While many provisions have been made to address 
and mitigate potential failure mechanisms, the risk of failures that could negatively impact the AGR-1 
irradiation remains significant.  The following operational contingencies are available to address 
situations that could arise during the course of the irradiation. 
x Thermocouple Drift and Failure – Given the service conditions and other technical considerations 
discussed in the previous section, some degree of thermocouple drift and failure is to be expected 
in the course of the irradiation.  Pre-test predictions will include multi-dimensional thermal 
analyses of the test train, which can be compared with indicated temperature distributions at the 
beginning of the irradiation.  If necessary, the thermal analyses can be adjusted to better match 
the indicated initial conditions and temperature data available prior to thermocouple failure, and 
used to help identify thermocouple drift and support capsule operations.  Operational 
contingencies are discussed below in terms of increasing degree of failure. 
- Substantial drift of one or more thermocouples within a capsule – Trends in the relative 
indications among the multiple thermocouples within a capsule, along with comparison to 
predicted trends from the 3-D thermal analyses and results from out-of-pile thermocouple 
testing can be used to identify and estimate the magnitude of drift of a thermocouple.  If a 
control thermocouple is experiencing drift, a bias can be applied to the temperature 
setpoint or control can be switched to another thermocouple with appropriate adjustment 
of the control setpoint. It is anticipated that establishing baseline responses for all 
thermocouples to compare with the detailed 3-D thermal model early in the irradiation 
prior to irradiation-induced changes in the capsule contents will be most useful to 
determine thermocouple drift and apply an appropriate bias. Once significant fissile 
depletion, shrinkage of the graphite and fuel, and changes in the conductivity of the fuel 
matrix occur, the ability to separate drift from the real thermal response is more difficult.  
Comparing the 3-D thermal model to the thermocouple responses at one or more fixed 
gas mixes at the beginning of every cycle will help separate out the effects of drift versus 
thermophysical and geometric changes in the capsule that will affect the predicted fuel 
temperature. Because of the large amount of data to be obtained in the capsule (e.g., 
thermocouple measurements, ATR lobe powers, flow gas mix) INL is evaluating the use 
of a statistical data analysis program to help in this evaluation and baselining activity. 
- Failure of a thermocouple within a capsule – If the failed thermocouple was the control 
thermocouple, control can be switched to a functioning thermocouple with appropriate 
adjustment of the control setpoint.  Temperature indications prior to failure, in 
conjunction with the 3-D thermal analysis, can be used to determine the temperature 
distribution within the capsule. 
- Failure of all thermocouples within a capsule – If all thermocouples within a capsule fail, 
control can be switched to manual with gas mixtures adjusted based on a combination of 
temperature indications from an adjacent capsule and thermal analyses.  Data from the 
fission product monitor for the capsule may also be used to provide confidence that 
temperatures are being maintained within the desired range. 
x Change in test train internal leakage – A limited amount of leakage flow from the test train 
common gas space to each of the capsules through the sliding seals at the bottom through-tube 
penetrations is expected.  Helium pressure in the common gas space will be maintained slightly 
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higher than the pressure in the capsules to assure in-leakage into the capsules and prevent cross-
contamination.  If a significant additional leakage path, say failure of a brazed capsule penetration, 
opened up, an increase in the helium flow would be required to maintain an overpressure in the 
common gas space.  This change plus changes in flow and pressure indications for the leaking 
capsule should be sufficient to identify that a leak has occurred and to identify the affected 
capsule.  Adjustments to the gas flows to the common space and the affected capsule can be used 
to mitigate the effect of the leak and prevent cross-contamination between capsules. 
x Capsule gas line failure – A leak in a supply or return line to one of the capsules would be more 
likely to occur during assembly of the capsule, and may be detected and repaired at that time.  If a 
leak were to occur during operation, mitigation actions would depend on whether it was in a 
supply or return line.  Analysis of the exhaust gas and indications from the fission product 
monitors should allow identification of the affected capsule.  Mitigation actions, in terms of 
adjustments to capsule and common space gas flow, and the impact of the failure would depend 
on the extent and location of the leak. 
x Excessive fuel failures within a capsule – ATR safety requirements can be met with percentage 
level failures in all of the capsules.  However, high failure levels within a capsule, as indicated by 
the fission gas monitor, may lead to concerns about cross-contamination and loss of data for other 
capsules, thus continued operation of the high release capsule at the planned temperature level 
may not be warranted.  Gas release levels and the potential for additional particle failures within 
the capsule can be mitigated by reducing capsule operating temperatures through increasing the 
helium fraction, and in-flow to the capsule from the common gas space can be increased by 
reducing capsule pressure through a reduction in capsule gas supply flow. 
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